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DO POISON PILLS INCREASE FIRM RISK?  
 




Management scholars have argued that an active takeover market discourages risk-taking by managers 
and that takeover defenses serve to counter the risk-reducing pressures of an active takeover market.  
This study employs the Black and Scholes Option Pricing Model to determine whether or not adoption 
of poison pill securities increases investor perceptions of firm risk.  The results provide evidence that 
the Option-Implied Standard Deviations of common stock returns increase significantly on the poison 
pill adoption date, on average.  Furthermore, the implied standard deviations remained significantly 
above pre-adoption levels for several days after the poison pill adoption, suggesting that the perceived 
increase in firm risk is permanent.  These results suggest the poison pills may serve a more constructive 
role in the governance of publicly traded firms than is generally assumed.   
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Many researchers have examined the impact of 
“Poison Pill” securities on firm value. The results of 
this research, which we summarize below, has been 
mixed. But few researchers have examined the impact 
of poison pills on risk taking. That is the research 
question this paper addresses. Speicifically, we test 
the hypothesis that poison pills increase the risk of 
firms that adopt them.   
Among the most controversial corporate 
governance issues is the continued wide-spread usage 
of poison pills. These special shareholder rights serve 
to impede takeovers and can be adopted by firms 
without shareholder approval. Consequently, 
institutional investors, shareholder activitists, and 
corporate governance organizations view poison pill 
adoption as a particularly aggregious disregard for 
shareholder welfare. For example, Institution 
Shareholder Services report that repealing poison pills 
is one of the top 5 issues for 2007 among the 
institutional investors they surveyed (Directorship, 
2006).   
The various high profile corporate scandals in 
the United States including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
and most recently Broadcom have increased scrutiny 
of corporate boards. Sarbanes-Oxley and the rising 
influence of investor activitist organization have led 
to more aggressive questioning of corporate 
governance practices in general, and poison pills in 
particular (Mills, 2004). The Wall Street Journal 
(2004) reports that firms are dropping poison pills and 
other takeover defenses, not only due to this 
shareholder pressure, but to earn favorable ratings 
from organizations that evaluate corporate 
governance. This pressure has resulted in the 
percentage of S&P500 firms with poison pills 
dropping from over 60% in 2002 to 47% by 2005 
(Jaffe, 2005). Repealing poison pills can be viewed as 
a favorable development if they are harmful to 
shareholder interests.   
 
The Case Against Poison Pills 
 
A long list of researchers contend that poison pill 
adoption is, in fact, hostile to shareholder interests 
because it reduces the threat of takeovers (Davis, 
1991; Field & Karpoff, 2002; Jensen, 1984; Malatesta 
& Walkling, 1988; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; 
Ryngaert, 1988). Researchers long ago documented 
gains to shareholders of takeover targets averaging 
40% or more (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Jarrell, 
Brickley & Netter, 1988). Consequently, any 
managerial action that reduces the probability of a 
takeover target being successfully acquired harms 
shareholders. Preliminary research suggests that 
poison pills represent one such managerial action.  
Ryngaert (1988), for example, found that firms with 
poison pills that received tender offers were almost 
17% less likely to be successfully acquired than firms 
without poison pills.   




By reducing the risk of takeovers, shareholders 
are potentially harmed in a variety of ways. First, they 
lose the bid premium from a possible takeover offer. 
Second, they lose a valuable tool for removing 
negligent executives that their board of directors will 
not act to remove. Finally, executives free from the 
threat of removal by a hostile acquirer can harm 
shareholders by over-diversifying  (Amihud & Lev, 
1981; Hoskission & Turk 1992; Jensen 1984), 
retaining free cash flows (Jensen, 1986), or under-
investing in research & development and other risky 
investments. These conclusions obtain for both 
established firms and IPOs (Field & Karpoff, 2002). 
Malatesta and Walkling (1988) provided the first 
detailed empirical analysis of the impact of poison 
pills on shareholder wealth. They examined stock 
market reactions to the poison pill adoptions through 
Marhc 1986. They found that shareholders lost a 
statistically significant .52% over the two days 
surrounding the poison pill adoption. Malatesta and 
Walking also provide evidence of lower accounting 
measures of performance for firms adopting poison 
pills than for comparable firms without poison pills. 
In addition to the threat of takeover, market-
based incentives (executive stock ownership and 
options), independent boards of directors, and large 
outside investors can reduce the threat of persistent 
mis-management or other agency problems.  
Corporate governance scholars contend that, because 
poison pills harm shareholders, their adoption signals 
a breakdown in the internal governance structure of 
the firm and their adoption will be more prevalent in 
firms with problematic governance structures.  
Problematic corporate governance structures would 
include firms where top executives have small equity 
investments, ownership is diffuse and boards of 
directors lack independence.   
Several studies have provided empirical 
evidence that weak internal governance typifies firms 
adopting poison pills. For example, CEOs of firms 
adopting poison pills own less equity in their firms 
than CEOs of firms without poison pills (Davis, 1991; 
Heron & Lie, 2006; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; 
Mallette & Fowler, 1992). Davis found that firms 
with poison pills have more diffuse share ownership 
than firms without poison pills (Davis, 1991).  Other 
researchers have noted that poison pills are typically 
adopted by firms with board structures that provide 
more discretion to management to engage in 
potentially self-serving behavior. Mallette and Fowler 
(1992) observed that firms with poison pills have dual 
leadership structures for their boards relatively 
infrequently. Heron and Lie (2006) found evidence 
that firms with staggered boards were more likely to 
adopt poison pills than firms that do not.   
 
Poison Pills Reconsidered 
 
Although poison pills have come under scrutiny from 
academics and practioners alike, poison pills continue 
to be one of the most utilized defense mechanisms 
among Standard and Poor’s 500 companies and their 
numbers are on the rise in small and mid-cap 
companies (Murti, 2005). This may be the result of 
the current heightened hostile merger and acquisition 
environment and may indicate that poison pills serve a 
constructive role for shareholders. For example, 
poison pills may provide shareholders with more 
bargaining power in a takeover attempt than they 
otherwise would have.   
In a tender offer with one bidder making an offer 
to diffuse shareholders, the would-be acquirer enjoys 
a monopsony. A poison pill that requires negotiation 
with target firm management, creates a bi-lateral 
monopoly, thereby increasing management bargaining 
power. Target firms with concentrated ownership 
(including large management stock holdings) would 
not receive this benefit from poison pills because a the 
tender offer bidding process would already be similar 
to a bi-lateral monopoly. As noted above, researchers 
have observed that firms adopting poison pills do not 
tend to have concentrated ownership or top executives 
with large equity holdings. Rather than providing 
evidence of weak internal governance, this result is 
consistent with the argument that the primary role of 
poison pills is to increase bargaining power in the 
context of a tender offer.  
To the extent the poison pill delays resolution of 
the takeover battle, other potential acquirers may enter 
the takeover contest, creating a competitive market for 
the target firm (Turk, 1992). Consistent with this, 
Heron and Lie (2006) provide evidence that poison 
pills are associated with higher takeover premiums 
and higher shareholder value. Consequently, this has 
caused many boards to reconsider their decision to 
rescind their poison pills and has left shareholders 
wondering whether the protective benefits of a poison 
pill outweigh the risk of managerial misconduct. A 
growing number of researchers are more directly 
questioning the empirical evidence indicating that 
poison pills generally harm shareholders. Ryngaert 
found evidence of significant declines in firm value, 
but for only selected subsets of his sample, whereas 
Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994), Strong and Meyer 
(1990), Turk, Zardkoohi, Hoskisson, Harrison, and 
Johnson (1994),and Loh (1992) found no evidence of 
significant declines in firm value associated with 
poison pill adoption. Studies by Bhagat and Jeffries 
(2005) and Coates (2000) suggest that econometric 
problems with previous research led to the mistaken 
conclusion that poison pills reduce firm market value.  
Similarly, Turk, Goh, and.Ybarra (2007) found no 
significant relationship between poison pill adoption 
and the long and short-term earnings forecasts by 
security analysts. Studies considering accounting 
measures of performance also found no relationship 
between poison pill adoption and decreased 
performance (Brickley, Coles & Terry, 1992; Davis, 
1991; Hebb & MacLean, 2006,  Mallette & Fowler, 
1992). A more recent study even provides evidence 
that poison pill adoption is associated with improved 




operating performance (Danielson and Karpoff, 
2006).  
Finally, some researchers have argued that there 
is no fundamental economic rationale leading to the 
adoption of poison pills. Rather firms adopt these 
takeover defenses because they are “fashionable” 
(Soule & Strang 1998) or they have been adopted by 
firms on whose board the top management sits 
(Haunschild 1993). Consequently, these researchers 
argue that poison pills hold little significance for 
shareholder interests. 
The research stream reviewed above provides 
little evidence that poison pills generally harm 
shareholders. Consequently, shareholder activist 
groups, corporate governance ratings organizations, 
and institutional investors pressuring boards to 
rescind poison pills, may be over-reacting to the 
preliminary theory and research from the 1980s 
regarding poison pills. In the next section we describe 
a rationale whereby poison pills perform a more 
constructive role.  
 
Poison Pills, Employment Risk, and Firm 
Strategy 
 
Whereas most scholars agree that threat of takeovers 
places pressure on management, financial economists 
have traditionally argued that the pressure an active 
takeover market provides stimulates efficiency and 
concern for shareholder interests.  Others have argued 
that pressure from active takeover markets, rather than 
stimulating efficiency, stimulates risk aversion and 
excessive concern about short-term accounting 
performance (Drucker, 1984; Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson 
1988; Lipton, 1985; Pugh, Page & Jahera, 1992; 
Scherer, 1988; Stein, 1988). To the extent that poison 
pills reduce the threat of hostile takeovers, they 
should encourage risk taking, according to these 
scholars. 
Proponents of an active takeover market argue 
that exactly the opposite result will obtain. To the 
extent that poison pills reduce the threat of hostile 
takeovers, they should encourage top executives to 
engage in self-serving behavior. Given that 
shareholders can own diversified portfolios of stock, 
but top executives do not work for a diversified 
portfolio of firms, agency theorists argue that top 
executives will be more risk averse than shareholders 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1986). Therefore, self-
serving managers will forego long term and high risk 
investments (Jensen, 1986; Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, 
1988). Poison pills and other takeover defenses that 
insulate top management from the threat of takeover 
should have the opposite effect and should be 
associated with reduced risk taking.   
Research has long demonstrated that reducing 
research and development and other risky or long 
term investments reduces shareholder wealth 
(McConnell & Muscarella, 1985; Woolridge & Snow, 
1990). Market efficiency dictates that firms 
committing resources to research and development 
and other risky investments could not possibly be 
persistently and systematically under-valued in the 
marketplace. Thus, managers that are overly risk 
averse in response to an active takeover market will 
reduce the value the firms they manage in the short 
run and increase the threat of a hostile takeover.  
Therefore, the threat of takeover should lead self-
serving managers to be less risk-averse.   
The presence of noise in market valuations, 
however, implies that the threat of takeover may 
increase managerial aversion to risky investments 
even if the market does not systematically undervalue 
such investments. An acquiring firm gains from an 
acquisition if the cost of the acquisition is less than 
the post-acquisition value of the target firm (Barney, 
1988). If the market value of a firm falls below the 
potential post-acquisition value of the firm by more 
than the cost of the acquisition, including any 
takeover premium offered and other transactions 
costs, the firm becomes an attractive takeover target.  
Thus, the market value of a firm must fall 
significantly below its potential value to face a serious 
threat of takeover. If investors value firms without 
error (that is, capital markets are perfect), then the 
market value of the firm can only fall significantly 
below its potential value if the management of the 
firm is inefficiently administering its resources.  
Capital markets are, of course, imperfect (Black, 
1986). Financial economists are clear to note that 
market efficiency does not imply that firms are priced 
accurately, but rather that security prices are an 
unbiased estimate of the future value of the firm.  
That is, stock prices are neither too high nor too low 
on average (Brown, Harlow & Tinic, 1988).  Stock 
prices represent "the market's collective estimate- 
although a 'noisy' estimate, to be sure- of the present 
value of the firm's future risky cash flows" (Brown, 
Harlow & Tinic, 1988).  As Black (1986) notes, "all 
estimates of value are noisy" (pg. 533) and noise in 
capital markets facilitates liquidity by creating the 
opportunity to trade profitably (French & Roll, 1985). 
An implication of noise trading in capital 
markets is that "the short term volatility of price will 
be greater than the short term volatility of value" 
(Black, 1986; pg. 533). This suggests that noise may 
cause a firm's stock price to trade significantly below 
its potential value as perceived by potential acquirers, 
for reasons other than ineffective management (Stein, 
1988). Underestimates by the market or over-
estimates by potential acquirers pose the threat of 
takeover to firms that are managed effectively (Roll, 
1986). This conclusion does not depend on any 
systematic bias in stock prices. Noise in stock prices 
increases the probability that a firm will be both 
significantly over-priced and significantly under-
priced, even if it is valued accurately on average. It 
also increases the probability that a would-be acquirer 
will significantly over-value or under-value the target.  
Only significant under-pricing by the market or over-
valuing by the acquirer increases the threat of 




takeover and raises the employment risk of the top 
executives. 
This line of reasoning suggests that in efficient, 
but noisy markets, any investments that increase noise 
in security prices will increase the employment risk 
for top management- even if those investments benefit 
shareholders, on average. High risk investments are 
those for which the costs and benefits are highly 
uncertain at the time of the investment decision and 
would lead to more subjective estimates of future cash 
flows. This increases the probability of both over- and 
under-valuing the firm, increasing the probability of 
becoming a takeover target. Low risk investments are 
those for which the costs and benefits are relatively 
easy for the firm estimate at the time of the 
investment decision and would lead to more precise 
estimates of future cash flows. This decreases the 
probability of both over- and under-valuing the firm, 
decreasing the probability of becoming a takeover 
target. Excessive diversification (Amihud & Lev, 
1981; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990), excessive retention 
of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986), and under-
investment in R&D (Stein, 1988) have all been 
proposed as ways managers may harm shareholders 
by reducing firm risk. 
Where the risk to management employment is 
high, agency theorists argue that top management will 
make investment decisions to reduce that risk. Self 
serving managers would be expected to forego high 
risk investments in the face of an active takeover 
market. In this study, we attempt to extend previous 
research by testing the hypothesis that insulation from 
the threat of takeover through poison pill adoption 
increases firm risk.   
Whereas several studies have examined the 
impact of strategic events on the market value of a 
firm, few have examined the impact of strategic 
events on firm risk, Ferreira and Laux (2007) 
examined the impact of takeover defenses on 
idiosyncratic risk. In their study, they lump all 
takeover defenses together, although previous 
research has shown that many takeover defenses 
clearly benefit shareholders (Turk, 1992; Walkling & 
Long, 1984). In addition, these authors controlled for 
factors that affect firm risk, whereas we propose that 
poison pill adoption will be associated with 
investments and other strategic decisions that affect 
risk.   
Methodological problems have traditionally 
plagued efforts to associate particular events with 
changes in risk. Most estimates of risk require data 
measured over intervals during which a number of 
confounding events may occur. Ferreira and Laux 
(2007), for example, estimated the idiosyncratic risk 
of a firm one year after adopting a poison pill.  No 
adjustment for confounding events was made in their 
sample. Indeed it would be rather impractical to do so. 
An examination of options prices, however, 
provides an opportunity to estimate daily changes in 
investor perceptions of risk. In this paper we test the 
hypothesis that poison pills increase investor 
perceptions of firm risk by estimating changes in the 
Option-Implied Standard Deviation of common stock 
returns during the days surrounding the adoption of 
poison pills.  In doing so, we apply the methodology 
that Levy and Yoder (1993) used to associate changes 
in firm risk with takeover announcements.  Although 
previous research has examined the relationship 
between antitakeover charter amendments and 
investment decisions (Mallette, 1991), this study 
provides a more direct test of the hypothesis that 
takeover defenses encourage risk taking.  
The model most widely used by academics and 
investors for valuing options is a variation of the 
Black and Scholes option pricing model (Black & 
Scholes, 1973).  In this paper,  we use the Black-
Scholes model modified for dividends as suggested by 
Merton (1973).   The Black and Scholes model values 
options as a function of their exercise price, the price 
of the underlying stock, time to expiration, the rate of 
return on risk free securities, and the volatility of the 
underlying stock.  Since all of these variables except 
volatility are known, changes in the standard 
deviation of the underlying security can be estimated 
from changes in options prices.  Changes in this 
"implied standard deviation" (ISD) can be measured 
during the days surrounding a strategic event to 
provide an estimate of the change in firm risk 
associated with that event.  Beckers (1981) has found 
ISDs to be better predictors of future stock return 
volatility than those estimated from time series of past 
stock returns and strongly suggests that ISDs do 
reflect a firm's risk.  This approach has been used in 
the finance literature to estimate the change in risk 
associated with a number of events, including stock 
splits (French & Dubofsky, 1986; Sheikh, 1989), 
mergers (Levy & Yoder, 1993), and earnings 




To test the hypothesis described above we assembled 
a sample consisting of all firms adopting poison pills 
before January 1, 1987. The firms were identified 
through the Corporate Control Alert, a legal news 
letter that identifies all firms receiving poison pills 
and the date of their adoption. We rely on this source 
to maintain consistency with other studies of poison 
pills (Brickley, Coles & Terry, 1992; Loh, 1992; 
Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988; Strong 
& Meyer, 1990; Turk, et al. 1994). Each of these 
previous studies also focused on adoption of poison 
pills prior to 1987. Thus our choice of sample 
maintains comparability with previous research on 
poison pills. Of these firms, we identified all firms 
with options traded on either the CBOE, American 
Exchange, Philadelphia Exchange, or Pacific 
Exchange. To be included in the sample, a firm must 
have an option trading near-the-money with an 
expiration date more than 35 days after the event 
period. 




The restrictions on option exercise price and 
maturity mitigate problems associated with the Black-
Scholes model. MacBeth and Merville (1979) found 
that the Black-Scholes model is less accurate for deep 
in-the-money and deep out-of-the-money options.  
MacBeth and Merville also show that the Black-
Scholes formula is sensitive to its underlying 
assumptions for options near their expiration date.  
Thus, we included the option for each firm with the 
exercise price closest to the stock price on forty days 
before the poison pill adoption (benchmark date).  For 
inclusion in the sample, the option expiration date 
must be at least 35 days after the end of the event 
period (4 days after the pill adoption). These selection 
criteria resulted in a final sample of 57 firms. 
To test the hypothesis that poison pill adoptions 
are associated with an increase in Option-Implied 
Standard Deviations, we compare the estimated ISDs 
during the days surrounding the poison pill adoption 
with a benchmark ISD estimated forty days prior to 
the adoption. The benchmark ISD is estimated forty 
days before the adoption to mitigate problems 
associated with potential information leakage.  
Specifically, we estimate: 
 ISDjt = ISDjt - ISDbj,   (1) 
where 
 ISDjt = change in ISD from the base period for firm 
j on day t (t=-4 to +4), 
  ISDjt = ISD for firm j on day t, and 
  ISDbj = ISD for firm j on day t -40, the benchmark 
ISD. 
The data required to estimate ISDs include: a) 
the poison pill adoption date; b) the option price; c) 
the option exercise price; d) the current stock price; e) 
the option expiration date; and f) the risk free rate. As 
with most previous studies on poison pills, the poison 
pill adoption date was obtained from Corporate 
Control Alert. Data on the option price, exercise price, 
expiration date, and stock prices were all obtained 
from the Wall Street Journal. Finally, the risk free rate 
was estimated by calculating the yield on the U.S. 
Treasury bill maturing closest to the option. Bid-Ask 
rates for estimating the yield on T-bills were obtained 
from the Wall Street Journal.  
We calculated ISDs each day from four days 
prior to the pill adoption through four days following 
the pill adoption. The event period begins four days 
before the pill adoption to control for the possibility 
that information regarding the adoption leaked to 
financial markets. We extend the analysis for four 
days after the announcement to assess whether or not 
any observed change in ISD is temporary. A T-test is 
used to estimate the statistical significance of changes 
in ISD relative to the benchmark. Specifically, the T-
statistic is calculated as: 
         ____        2 
Tt =   ISDt  / (St / n)0.5,    (2) 
where 
____         n 
 ISDt  =    ISDjt / n, 
                j=1 
        2        n                  ____       
       St  =     ( ISDjt -  ISDt )2 / (n-1), and 
                 j=1 




Table 1 displays the estimated mean difference 
between the benchmark ISD and the event period 
ISDs and the statistical significance of that difference.  
The results presented in Table 1 offer support for the 
hypothesis that poison pill adoptions are associated 
with an increase Option-Implied Standard Deviations, 
on average. Prior to the poison pill adoption date, 
there is no statistically significant increase in mean 
ISD relative to the mean benchmark ISD. On the 
poison pill adoption date, mean ISD is a statistically 
significant .0559 higher than the mean bench mark 
ISD (t=2.561). Mean ISD continues to rise slightly 
during the days following the poison pill adoption.  
For days +1 through +4, mean increase in ISD relative 
to the benchmark ISD remains statistically significant 
with t-statistics ranging from 3.48 to 3.92 (p<.01).  
This suggests that the rise in ISD is not a temporary 
phenomenon but represents a shift in investor 
perceptions of firm risk following the adoption of 
poison pills. On day +4, mean ISD is approximately 
30% higher than the mean benchmark ISD (t=3.784).  
____________________ 





Critics of poison pills argue that the threat of takeover 
spurs efficiency and stimulates strategic change.  
Other scholars have argued that the pressures of the 
takeover market stimulate risk aversion and short-
sightedness, rather than efficiency. This latter 
argument implies that takeover defenses, such as 
poison pills, may induce top executives to approve 
risky investment that they may have foregone in the 
absence of the takeover protection.   
In this paper, we provide evidence that supports 
the hypothesis that investors associate poison pill 
adoptions with an increase in firm risk. Investor 
perceptions of firm risk, as measured by Option-
Implied Standard Deviations, rose a statistically 
significant 30% following the adoption of poison 
pills. This statistically significant increase in Implied 
Standard Deviation continues to persist four days after 
the poison pill adoption. This suggests that changes in 
implied standard deviations following poison pill 
adoption are not a temporary phenomenon but 
represent a significant change in investor perceptions 
of future firm risk.  
Note that no systematic biases in capital markets 
are necessary to generate this result. Rather, noise in 




capital market valuations discourages investment in 
any area that significantly increases the degree of 
noise.  Thus, evidence of market efficiency in no way 
implies that takeovers do not lead rational managers 
to alter investment decisions.  This result is consistent 
with both agency theory and existing evidence on 
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Table 1. Mean Change in Option-Implied Standard Deviation  
Between the Event Period and the Benchmark Period 
 
This table provides the mean difference between Option-Implied Standard Deviations (ISDs) around the 
announcement of poison pill adoption and the benchmark ISDs prevailing forty days prior to the adoption. 
 
 ____________________________________________ 
                                           Mean Change 
 Day   in ISD   T-Statistic 
 ____________________________________________ 
 
 -4   0.0215     1.337   
 -3   0.0195     1.358   
 -2   0.0248     1.582   
 -1   0.0293     1.887   
 Poison Pill  0.0559     2.561**  
 +1   0.0708     3.553**  
 +2   0.0767     3.481**  
 +3   0.0873     3.921**  
 +4   0.0851     3.784**  
 ____________________________________________ 
 
*   p<.05 
**  p<.01 
  
 
